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APPOINTMENT OF NON-RESIDENT ADMINISTRATORS
TO CREATE FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION*
IN recent years, attorneys for the estates of decedents and persons under
disability have made increasing use of the appointment of non-resident ad-
ministrators as a means of obtaining federal diversity jurisdiction. It has been
estimated, for example, that such cases comprise 20.5 per cent of the total
diversity suits brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.' Usually the
non-resident administrator has no relationship whatsoever to the deceased or
his heirs. In most states all that need be done to appoint a new administrator
is to have the original administrator resign and then to petition the probate
court for certification of the chosen successor,2 a certification which is often
automatic. And an attorney for an estate will often wait until the estate is
completely probated, except for the prosecution of the particular cause of ac-
tion, before replacing the administrator with a non-resident successor.3
Administrators invoking diversity jurisdiction rely on Rule 17(a) 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. With one exception, 5 that rule confers on
personal representatives the status of real party in interest. This means of
obtaining federal jurisdiction is successful, however, only if the appointment
of the non-resident administrator does not come within the terms of Section
1359 of the Judicial Code, a provision designed to control the manufacturing
of diversity jurisdiction. That statute requires the dismissal of any action in
which the parties have been "improperly or collusively made or joined" for
purposes of obtaining federal jurisdiction.6 To date, attorneys have been al-
*Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963), affirming 217 F. Supp.
873 (D. Corn. 1963).
1. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 122-23 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963).
As a question of first impression, it would seem that courts should bar jurisdiction
for such cases in which the appointment may be viewed as nothing but subterfuge and
brings disrepute on the whole of diversity jurisdiction. Although recent proposals to
prohibit this manipulation of administrators may evidence the validity of this reaction,
court interpretation of the collusive jurisdiction statute has been more lenient. For two
of the recent restrictive proposals see H.R. 2832 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), printed
at 109 CONG. REC. 1108 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1963) ; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF
THE DivISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1963).
2. See 33 C.J.S. Executors and Adninistrators, § 82 (1942).
3. See, e.g., Fike Estate, 80 Pa. D. & C. 322, 323 (Orphans' Ct. 1951).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) provides in part:
Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in, the name of the real
party in interest; but an executor, administrator, guardian. trustee of an express
trust ... may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose
benefit the action is brought ....
5. See note 55 infra and accompanying text.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1958) provides:
Parties collusively joined or made. A district court shall not have jurisdiction of
a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly
or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.
Section 1359 has evolved from the "assignee clause" in the original Judiciary Act of
1789, 1 Stat. 78. The purpose of that clause was "to prevent the manufacture of Federal
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most uniformly successful in convincing courts that the appointment of a non-
resident administrator does not fall within the prohibition of Section 1359.7
Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co.," is a typical instance. Decedent in Lang, a
resident of Connecticut, was killed by a bulldozer owned by defendant. The
intestate heirs, the original administratrix (decedent's mother) and defend-
ant, were also citizens of Connecticut. After cleaning up the entire estate ex-
cept for the outstanding wrongful death action, the administratrix resigned.
Plaintiff Lang, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was immediately appointed successor
administrator by the probate court and within the week brought suit in the
federal district court on the wrongful death claim. The parties stipulated that
the current administrator had no personal relationship with the decedent or
any of the, heirs, and that the primary motive for his appointment was the
creation of diversity jurisdiction. 9 Nevertheless, both the district court and
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that this manufacture of
diversity jurisdiction did not violate Section 1359 and refused to dismiss the
suit.' 0
The lenient attitude manifested by the courts in Lang is by no means novel;
the Third Circuit, in Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc.," had come to the same
diversity jurisdiction." See Historical and Revision notes following 28 U.S.C.A. § 1359
(1958); Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank, 268 U.S. 449, 453 (1925). By Act of March
3, 187S, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, a provision was added directing circuit courts to dis-
miss any suit whenever it appears that "the parties have been improperly or collusively
made or joined . . . for the purpose of creating a case cognizable" in the federal court.
The purpose of this provision was to give the federal courts clear "statutory authority
and direction to dismiss an original action or remand a removed suit where federal juris-
diction has been manufactured." MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDIcAL CODE 151
(1949). Section 1359 has been construed to re-enact the provisions of the Act of 1875
and its successor, Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24(1), 36 Stat 1091, without any
substantial change. Jaffe v. Philadelphia & W.R.R., 180 F.2d 1010, 1012 n.4 (3d Cir.
1950). For the purposes of this note these predecessor statutes will be considered identical
to § 1359, and the cases interpreting these statutes deemed applicable to a consideration
of § 1359.
7. Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 788 n.10 (3d Cir. 1959), lists the pre-
vious cases which are considered to support the validity of jurisdiction manufactured
through appointment of a non-resident administrator. The following later cases also sup-
port this practice: County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961) ; Jamison
v. Kammerer, 264 F.2d 789 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959); Meehan v.
Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
Only two cases have disapproved of this maneuver and held that § 1359 precluded
federal jurisdiction: Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949)-ap-
parently overruled by McCoy v. Blakely, 217 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1957) ; Cerri v. Akron-
People's Telephone Co., 219 Fed. 285 (N.D. Ohio 1914). Professor Moore cites Cerri
with approval and states that "the real party in interest rule may not be manipulated for
the purpose of founding jurisdiction." 3 MOORE, FaEDRAL PRACTICE ff 17.05, at 1320 (2d
ed. 1963).
8. 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963), affirming 217 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn. 1963). The
Second Circuit approved in its entirety the District Court opinion of Judge Timbers.
9. 217 F. Supp. at 874-75.
10. 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963).
11. 264 F2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959).
The Corabi opinion appears to be the best-reasoned among the many cases upholding
such manufactured jurisdiction (see note 7 supra) and has been cited with approval in
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conclusion on a similar state of facts. This attitude seems derived from a series
of Supreme Court decisions interpreting Section 1359 in the corporate con-
text. The most famous of these cases is Black & White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.'2 where a Kentucky cor-
poration desired to enter into a contract which Kentucky state courts would
predictably hold invalid, but which would predictably be upheld by federal
courts applying federal common law under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson.'3
Before contracting, the Kentucky corporation conveyed all its property to a
newly created Tennessee corporation, whose stock, it must be assumed, was
every similar case since its decision. See, e.g., Lang: "while the decision of the Third
Circuit in Corabi is not controlling on this Court, it is persuasive and will be followed,
absent a decision on the question, by the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit." 217
F. Supp. at 877. Similar approval of Corabi was voiced by the Second Circuit in affirm-
ing the District Court decision. 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963). Before the Corabi de-
cision, Jaffe v. Philadelphia & W.R.R., 180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950), was considered
the chief case in point, not because of the court's reasoning, but merely because it stood
for the proposition that the appointment of a non-resident administrator to gain, federal
jurisdiction was not precluded by § 1359. In fact, its reasoning has little merit. The
court relied on the "real party in interest test" of Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co.,
284 U.S. 183 (1931), in which the Supreme Court upheld the destruction of diversity
through the appointment of an administrator who was a citizen of defendant's state.
Jaffe's reliance on Mecom involves a distortion of that holding, for it is difficult to in-
voke language from an opinion allowing the elimination of diversity in order to justify a
decision allowing its creation, especially in light of the contrasting federal policies regard-
ing the destruction and creation of diversity. As Professor Moore points out, while there
is a federal policy against manipulation creating diversity, there is no policy against its
destruction. 3 MooRE, FDERAL PRAcCE [ 17.05, at 1320-21 (2d ed. 1963). See also
Note, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 897 (1948). The Jaffe court further maintained that a federal
court is precluded from inquiring into the motives and intentions behind plaintiff's ap-
pointment as administrator. The court justified this position' with the argument that to
inquire into what lies behind the appointment is to attack collaterally the decree of the
probate court designating the administrator. However, a mere examination by the federal
court into the circumstances of the appointment does not appear to constitute such an
attack. A finding that the administrator could not sue in federal court would in no way
impair the validity of the appointment itself or preclude the administrator from suing
in the state courts. Even if the federal court's examination were to disclose that the
administrator had secured his appointment by false pretenses, his capacity or right to sue
in the state probate court would not be impaired. See generally American Car & Foundry
Co. v. Anderson, 211 Fed. 301 (8th Cir. 1914); and Fridley v. Farmers & Mechanics
Say. Bank, 136 Minn. 333, 162 N.W. 454 (1917).
The reasoning behind Jaffe, then, would appear to be faulty and insufficient to justify
the decision. The other non-resident administrator cases rely for the most part on either
this reasoning in Jaffe or upon the test discussed in the text infra. Since Corabi appears
to embody the best of the reasoning used to uphold such appointments, it will form the
basis for this discussion of their propriety.
12. 276 U.S. 518 (1928). See also Southern Realty Inv. Co. v. Walker, 211 U.S. 603
(1909); Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895); Morris v. Gilmer,
129 U.S. 315 (1889); Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 928 (1963); Sheehan v. Municipal Light & Power Co., 151 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.
1945) ; Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Curlee Clothing Co., 19 F.2d 439 (8th Cir.
1927); Hurst v. McNeil, 12 Fed. Cas. 1039 (No. 6936) (C.C. Pa. 1804).
13. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See notes 36-38 infra and accompanying text.
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held by the same stockholders. The Kentucky corporation dissolved itself
immediately thereafter. The new Tennessee corporation then proceeded to
negotiate the desired contract and, two months later, brought suit in the Ken-
tucky District Court to enjoin defendant, a Kentucky corporation, from in-
terfering with the recently acquired contract rights. The Supreme Court
rejected the contention that the predecessor to Section 1359 was applicable
and refused to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction. The corporation's
motive, it said, was irrelevant; since the transfer to the Tennessee corporation
was complete, and the corporation was a citizen of Tennessee, diversity juris-
diction could not be denied. 14 The result in Black & White seemed a departure
from the Supreme Court reading of the same section a few years earlier. In
Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Irrigation Co.15 a corporation went
through a similar interstate ballet, and the Court held that diversity jurisdic-
tion was unavailable. There is one salient factual distinction between the two
cases. in Miller & Lux the original corporation rather than its stockholders
held all the stock of the new corporation. The original corporation remained
in existence, transacting its ordinary business, and transferring to the out-of-
state corporation only that property which was to be involved in the law-
suit. The Court found that the plaintiff corporation had violated Section 1359
and dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The failure to dissolve the
original corporation and the ability of that corporation to compel a reconvey-
ance of the proceeds of the suit from the plaintiff corporation without con-
sideration indicated to the Court that the conveyance of the cause of action
to the new corporation was not a permanent or "real" transaction.' 6 The
reservation of the power to pull the proceeds immediately back into the orig-
inal jurisdiction signaled a failure to detach the new entity sufficiently from
the forum. The peculiarity of this distinction rests on the court's treatment of
future behavior. The motive of the Tennessee corporation in Black & White
was to be disregarded; but the potential action of the old Miller & Lux cor-
poration seemed to be central to the Court's finding of a Section 1359 viola-
tion.17
Translating these cases into the context of estate administration, the Corabi
14. 276 U.S. at 524-25.
15. 211 U.S. 293 (1908). Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895),
has similar facts and is commonly cited with Miller & Lux as standing for the me
principles.
16. 211 U.S. 300-04.
17. This test has been utilized by other courts in differentiating between collusive
and non-collusive attempts to create diversity. See, e.g., Tower Realty Co. v. City of
East Detroit, 185 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1950) (remanded to district court for factual deter-
mination) ; Paper Makers Importing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 165 F. Supp. 491 (E.D.
Wis. 1958) ("complete and irrevocable transfer" held valid to create diversity).
In McDonald v. Smalley, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 620 (1828), land was sold to plaintiff for
less than. its value because the vendor doubted that his title would be sustained in the state
courts. Plaintiff, a resident of another state, sued the defendant for a conveyance in the
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The Court found good consideration
and held the conveyance binding on both plaintiff and his vendor and effective to extin-
guish the resident vendor's title. In upholding the federal jurisdiction, the Court concluded
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court found the facts more like Black & White than Miller & Lux.'8 All for-
mal ties were cut. The old administrator had resigned and the appointment
of the successor administrator had been approved by the state probate court.
No other objective action was available to make the transfer more permanent.
Under Rule 17, the court was precluded from looking behind the adminis-
trator to determine whether the actual beneficiaries of the suit were citizens
of the defendant's state.' 9 But by restricting itself to the severance of formal
connections in cases involving appointment of non-resident administrators, the
court validated all such attempts to obtain diversity jurisdiction. While the
plaintiffs in Corabi had done everything they could to make the change in ad-
ministrators permanent, it is equally true that they could have done no less
and still have made an effective change.20 Black & White could have been dis-
tinguished in both Corabi and Lang on the ground that all business of the
forum-state corporation had been transferred to the new corporation; in Miller
& Lux the new corporation received only those rights necessary to enable it
to prosecute the litigation. Seen from this perspective, cases like Corabi and
Lang resemble Miller & Lux, since all that is left for the out-of-state adminis-
trator is the prosecution of the diversity action.21
The permissive interpretation of Section 1359 seems unwise for reasons
other than its use of precedent. An expansive view of diversity jurisdiction
seems strangely at odds with the attitude of the Supreme Court toward federal
question jurisdiction. Though there is no equivalent for Section 1359 in the
federal question jurisdiction area, the Court has steadfastly refused to inter-
pret that jurisdictional grant broadly. It will not entertain suits in which a
federal question is raised by the anticipation of a defense, even where this
question is clearly the sole issue of the case.2 2 It has been said that federal
that since plaintiff could not have maintained an action in debt for his money nor the
vendor a suit for the land transferred, the transaction was real and permanent.
18. The court concluded that it could not "distinguish the facts of . . . [Black &
White] in any practical way from those of the case at bar." It stated that it would, how-
ever, have 'consider[ed] the decision in . . .Miller & Lux as persuasive were it not for
the latter decision" in Black & White. 264 F.2d at 787.
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
20. All that need be done to replace an, administrator is to have the probate court
accept the resignation of the old administrator and approve the appointment of a suc-
cessor. This has qualified the maneuver as real, irrevocable and complete, but it must be
noted that these minimal actions are required for any change in administrators in order
to comply with the probate laws, and might be viewed as having no more relation to the
formal completeness of the break with the forum state than did the incorporation of the
new non-resident company in Miller & Lux.
21. In both Corabi and Lang the original administrator cleared up the entire estate
except for the outstanding action for wrongful death. This cause of action, was prosecuted
by the successor non-resident administrator and constituted his sole contribution to, and
connection with, the estate.
22. In Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), the Court raised the
jurisdictional question, on its own and dismissed the action, although it was clear that the
issue would eventually be decided by a federal court. Indeed, the same case was back
before the Court for a decision on the merits three years later, after the state court
remedies had been exhausted. 219 U.S. 467 (1911).
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question jurisdiction cannot be enlarged by artful pleading, 23 nor by improp-
erly seeking equitable relief,24 nor by an action for declaratory judgment. 25
In these cases, a court is dealing with the status of the legal issues, while in
the manufactured diversity cases it is dealing with the unnatural status of the
parties; the questions presented in federal question cases are particularly
within the competency of the federal courts. If reluctance to take doubtful
cases involving federal questions is soundly grounded, doubtful cases in diver-
sity should be more readily shunned.
The analogy to problems in federal question jurisdiction indicates that the
scope of Section 1359 cannot be determined, and the policies behind diver-
sity jurisdiction carried out, by concentrating solely on the incident of change
relating to the plaintiff's citizenship. The Supreme Court has shied away from
motive in testing when collusion is present for Section 1359 purposes ;26 but
in cases like Corabi and Lang, where the factual indicia are so unrevealing, 27
it may be necessary to inquire into motive to test whether diversity has been
collusively manufactured.
The Supreme Court has never given a reason for its consistent refusal to
consider party intent. One rationale, suggested by the Corabi court, rests on
a literal reading of Section 1359: "[A] district court shall not have juris-
diction of a civil action in which any party . . .has been improperly or col-
lusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court. '28 Since the
part of the statute beginning "to invoke" seems to impose a requirement that
there be an intent to create diversity, it can be argued that the statutory
phrase "improperly or collusively" must mean that something other than mere
intent is required by Section 1359,29 namely "fictitious" and "sham" acts.
At the level of word analysis it is difficult to quarrel with this suggestion.
Such a statutory interpretation, however, may overlook the basic policies of
the statute.30
23. Skely Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
24. White v. Sparkill Realty Corp., 280 U.S. 500 (1930). See 2 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 2.07[3], at 404-05 (2d ed. 1962).
25. Public Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
26. See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellkw Taxicab & Trans-
fer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 524 (1928); McDonald v. Smalley, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 620, 624
(1828). See also Cohan & Tate, Manufacturing Federal Diversity Jurisdiction by the
Appointment of Representatives: Its Legality and Propriety, 1 VILL. L. REv. 201, 209
(1956).
27. See note 20 mipra and accompanying text
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1958). See note 6 supra.
29. The court in Corabi made such an argument in its decision. 264 F.2d at 788. It
does not appear, however, that this was the primary basis for the decision, since it was
utilized merely as support for the conclusion otherwise reached by analysis of Black &
White.
30. In Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895), the Court noted
that the construction of the collusive jurisdiction statute is a practical rather than a
mechanical matter, because if not so construed it "would become of no practical value,
and the dockets of the Circuit Courts ... [would) be crowded with suits of which neither
the framers of the Constitution nor Congress ever intended they should take cognizance."
Id. at 343. See also Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 97 (1957), in which the Court repeated
the admonition that application of § 1359 should be practical rather than mechanical.
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Though there is overabundant dispute on the issue, the principal policy basis
for diversity jurisdiction is claimed to be the possibility that state courts will
be biased against non-residents. 31 If an individual completely severs his con-
nection with one state and becomes a citizen of another, this bias justification
could be said to apply to him regardless of his motive for changing citizen-
ship.32 Thus, in Black & White plaintiff's appearance was entirely that of a
Tennessee corporation, and was nearly certain to remain so.3 3 In Miller &
Lux, on the other hand, the original corporation did not dissolve.3 4 The resi-
dual domestic quality presumably would have become known to the jury or
judge, who would then, hypothetically, have had no reason (other than that
provided them by the corporation's self-serving exercise) to vent their local
prejudices.
Whatever strength it may have for diversity jurisdiction generally, how-
ever, the presumption of bias is a poor weapon for the defense of the suitor
who has rendered himself a foreigner principally in order to obtain the bene-
fits of that jurisdiction. The party who seeks to create diversity jurisdiction
is not likely to do so because of fear that state tribunals will be prejudiced
against him as a foreigner. He will have other reasons for his choice. If these
reasons are ones the court should not honor, then, the lenient rule of Corabi
and Lang should be abandoned in favor of a stricter test.
Although the implications of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 3 5 for Section 1359
were ignored in Corabi and Lang, Erie should provide the framework for
Mechanically giving the words "collusively" and "improperly" such literal significance
would defeat the practical policy against manufactured jurisdiction and forum shopping
embodied in both § 1359 and the Erie decision.
31. Although the grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts has several
explanations, this is the most widely accepted. 1 MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 0.60 [8-4]
at 636 (2d ed. 1960). See generally Phillips & Christenson, The Historical and Legal
Background of the Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A.J. 959 (1960); Meador, A New
Approach to Limiting Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A.J. 383 (1960); Marbury, Why
Should We Limit Federal Diversity Jurisdiction?, 46 A.B.A.J. 379 (1960); Doub, An
Old Problem: The Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 45 A.B.A.J. 1273 (1959); Wechsler,
Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
216 (1948); Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. Rxv.
483 (1928). For a more complete statement of the policies often found for diversity
jurisdiction, see Note, 73 YALE L.J. 850 (1964).
32. Such a rationale establishes a presumption of bias against a non-resident in state
courts. Once it is determined that he is a citizen of another state, the court is precluded
from looking behind that presumption in order to determine whether such bias is a real
possibility. See, e.g., Baker v. Keck, 13 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Ill. 1936). In view of the
many problems inherent in attempting to determine whether bias actually exists, such a
presumption would appear reasonable.
33. Had the corporation re-incorporated in Kentucky, the contract it sought to vali-
date by moving to Tennessee would have become invalid. Since the contract was un-
enforceable under state law, moving back into Kentucky, by giving the Kentucky courts
jurisdiction, would only serve to resurrect the very problem which the corporation suc-
cessfully avoided by leaving the state.
34. The Court found that the proceeds of the suit could, and probably would, be
transferred back to the original corporation. 211 U.S. at 304.
35. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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examining these reasons. Cases like Black & White and Miller & Lux were
creatures of Swift v. Tyson,36 which Erie overruled. The Swift doctrine
allowed federal courts sitting in a given state to apply substantive law which
differed from that applied by the state courts. Therefore, a non-citizen plain-
tiff could determine whether a state or federal court should adjudicate a par-
ticular case on the basis of which court would apply law more favorable to his
position.37 In diversity cases, the inevitable result was widespread federal-state
"forum shopping" to choose the court with the more favorable substantive
law.38 To a large extent, Erie was a reaction against such forum shopping.39
And the "outcome-determinative" test enunciated in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York 40 and other Erie progeny represents a further application of such a
policy. These cases hold that in all diversity cases the outcome of the litigation
in the federal court should be substantially the same as it would have been
if tried in the state courts. 41
Erie did not, of course, entirely obviate the need for Section 1359. The
very fact that a dual system of courts exists means that there will be some
36. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). For discussion of Erie's ramifications, see 1 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE f .304 (2d ed. 1960) and articles cited therein.
37. See, e.g., Fellman, Ten Years of the Supreme Court: 1937-1947, 41 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 1142, 1150 (1947); Note, 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 71, 75 (1938).
38. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7, 9 (1963) ; Snepp,
The Law Applied in the Federal Courts, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 165, 167 (1948) ;
Miller, Swift v. Tyson and Some Considerations of Philosophy in American Law, 11
Miss. L.J. 243, 251 (1939) ; Bowman, The Unconstitutionality of the Rule of Swift v.
Tyson, 18 B.U.L. REv. 659, 664-65 (1938); Note, 22 MINN. L. REv. 885, 887 (1938).
39. Commentators have frequently mentioned the elimination of forum shopping in
the federal system as an important policy basis for the Erie decision. See, e.g., Quigley,
Congressional Repair of the Erie Derailment, 60 MICH. L. REv. 1031, 1071 (1962);
Gorrell & Weed, Erie Railroad: Ten Years After, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 276, 284 (1948);
Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tonip-
kins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 287, 294 (1946) ; Note, 30 MIN. L. REV. 643, 645 (1946). See
also HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 634 (1953).
40. 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
41. "In essence, the intent of that decision [Erie] was to insure that, in all cases
where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizen-
ship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be sub-
stantially the same ... as it would be if tried in a State court." Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). Recently the Supreme Court has stated that this outcome-
determinative test will fall if the state law to be applied conflicts with affirmative federal
policy. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op, 356 U.S. 525 (1958). Allowing state pro-
bate practice to control the scope of diversity jurisdiction would be disruptive of federal
jurisdictional practice. It might be argued, then, that the Lang and Corabi situation is
disruptive of a federal policy of sound jurisdiction and should not be allowed.
For discussion of the outcome-determinative test, both past and present, see, e.g.,
Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection, 48 IowA L. REv. 248 (1963); Note, 71
YALE L.J. 344 (1961) ; Quigley, supra note 33; Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The
Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187 (1957);




differences-in procedure, for example-between the two judicial systems,
and counsel may well have sufficient preference for one system over the other
to go to some trouble to gain entrance to it. An attorney may consider that
federal calendars are less congested, federal judges superior, federal discovery
rules more advantageous or federal juries likely to return higher verdicts.42
It may be impractical, impossible or undesirable to eliminate all these differ-
ences. Thus, parties will continue to be tempted to forum shop by manufac-
turing diversity jurisdiction. Correspondingly, the change accompanying Erie
should bring with it a change in statutory interpretation. Where Section 1359
was once viewed as primarily aimed at preventing frauds on the court,43 its
principal utility today should be the avoidance of undesirable forum shop-
ping." Of course, a non-resident can be viewed as forum-shopping whenever
he decides to bring a case in, or to remove to, a federal court. But the con-
stitutional protections of diversity, however vague they may be, are legitimate-
ly his to claim. Where a party has manufactured diversity of citizenship, it is
at best artificial to claim that he needs those protections; if his intent to forum
shop is blatant and unmistakable, Section 1359 should be applied to deny him
diversity jurisdiction.
Intent, however, is difficult to discern; abandonment of the Corabi test
might be opposed on the ground that inquiry into motive is too subjective.
In dealing with a motion to dismiss, moreover, the court would be required
to resolve factual questions no less complex than questions likely to be pre-
sented at the final stage. Litigants would suffer substantial expense and de-
lay. Yet these are problems of proof rather than substance, and they are
problems which often may not arise. A firm rule presenting substantial im-
pediments to diversity where collusion is suspected will dissuade many plain-
tiffs from attempting the barrier. More important, difficulties of proof will
be reduced as the courts develop expertise in the administration of the rule.
And inquiry into motive need not involve a full trial, with taking of oral
42. For an interesting analysis of the various factors which influence federal-state
forum shopping, see Summers, Analysis of Factors That Influence Choice of Forum in
Diversity Cases, 47 IOWA L. Rav. 933 (1962).
The courts are not blind to the fact that the prime motivation behind the choice of
federal courts is often the belief that federal juries grant higher verdicts. See, e.g., Corabi
v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 788 (3d Cir. 1959). Attorney for plaintiff in Lang
gave three reasons for preferring a federal court over that of a state:
... the enlightened rules of practice in the Federal Courts . . . the uniform excel-
lence of the judiciary . . . and, finally, because the jury selection system . . . has
resulted consistently in the seating of intelligent jury panels.
217 F. Supp. at 875 n.4.
43. See, e.g., Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895), where Justice
Harlan concluded that the transfer of land "for the express purpose" of "creating a case
for the Federal Court, must be regarded ... as a fraud upon that court." Id. at 339. See
also Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Curlee Clothing Co., 19 F.2d 439, 440 (8th Cir.
1927).
44. See notes 35-41 supra and accompanying text.
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evidence. Factors susceptible of summary presentation can be identified in the
realities of plaintiffs' relations to the forum state and the cause of action.
Where plaintiffs seeking the haven of diversity are individuals suing in their
own right, the factors traditionally used by courts to distinguish real from
sham claims of citizenship seem to be well grounded in realities which tend
to show predominant intent. These factors go to the question whether the
individual has established citizenship in the new state; they most frequently
include inquiry into the completeness of departure from the old state (Has
furniture been moved? Have bank accounts been closed?) and the fullness of
life in the new (Has plaintiff a job? A home? Has he registered? Voted? Or
taken part in civic activities?).45 For an individual, formal and actual taking
leave of a state may be indistinguishable; it may be postulated that the costs
of breaking off relations to the degree required by the courts are so high that
they are unlikely to be borne in a mere attempt to gain entrance to a federal
court. Although the courts have consistently disclaimed that a primary intent
to obtain diversity is a dispositive factor, the criteria they have adopted have
the effect of making it most unlikely that a plaintiff with such an intent will
succeed.
Similarly, objective criteria exist where a corporation is the suspect plain-
tiff, even though the formality of transfer of state of incorporation may signify
little about the "real" citizenship of the corporation. Formalities meant little,
for example, in Black & White; there, it must be assumed, the new corpora-
tion did business wholly in Kentucky and was owned and operated entirely
by Kentuckians. On the other hand, a change of corporate citizenship, in the
formal sense, will often reflect real changes. The process of dissolving a fairly
large corporation is a tedious and expensive one not likely to be undertaken
merely to obtain the tenuous benefits of federal jurisdiction in one suit. Such
a change will often reflect changes in corporate structure or differential bene-
fits under state law which the corporation is free to choose. Yet, where a
corporation is closely held and predominantly active in the forum state, a
sudden change in citizenship should not buy entrance to diversity jurisdic-
tion, however complete the change in formal terms, absent some strong show-
ing by plaintiff that his motives are not as they appear.46 Whether or not as a
recognition of the policy against manufactured diversity, Congress has in fact
acted to close federal courts to such corporations. In 1958 it passed a statute
making corporations citizens of the state of their principal place of business
as well as of the state of incorporation, thus limiting the occasions on which
45. See, e.g., Baker v. Keck, 13 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Ill. 1936).
46. Such a contrary showing has been successful in the past. Thus, in Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Curlee Clothing Co., 19 F,2d 439 (8th Cir. 1927), where it was
shown that the defective re-incorporation (a power of recovery existed) was decided
upon "without contemplation" of the impending litigation, that the "change was intended
to be permanent and that federal jurisdiction was only one and probably a minor con-
sideratior for the change," the Court refused to dismiss plaintiff's claim under § 1359.
Id. at 440.
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corporations have access to federal courts,47 and foreclosing the possibility
that, on its particular facts, Black & White could ever recur.
The indicia developed in the corporation cases fail completely when applied
to cases where the appointment of personal representatives is the cause of the
alleged collusive diversity. The only formality required to create diversity is
the appointment itself, an act performed with particular ease. Jurisdiction
can be manufactured with such facility that the possibilities for forum shopping
are greatly increased. 48 But the circumstances underlying the appointment
may provide a court with many of the indicia by which it ordinarily deter-
mines intent. Thus, if, pursuant to a state wrongful death statute or survivors
act calling for appointment of an administrator ad prosequendum,49 an ad-
ministrator is appointed who is not a citizen of the state in which the estate
is being probated, federal courts should be reluctant to grant federal juris-
diction to that administrator. His duties are temporary and related solely to
the suit, for without the cause of action there would be no administrator,50
and the appointment of a non-resident for such temporary and singularly
directed activities gives rise to an inference that the appointment was primarily
for purposes of obtaining federal jurisdiction. In many cases, the circum-
stances may be even clearer. Typically, the administrator of an estate will
have duties beyond the maintenance of the suit. It then becomes possible
to scrutinize the allocation of duties and functions between forum and foreign
administrators and to draw inferences from it about the motivation for ap-
pointments. In many instances, as was the case in Lang and Corabi, a resident
administrator will perform the routine tasks of administering the estate and
then resign in favor of a non-resident who will bring suit. An inference
should arise that the appointment, as administrator, of a non-resident whose
sole or primary duty was the bringing of suit was intended primarily to pro-
cure federal jurisdiction; if this inference of intent is not rebutted, jurisdic-
tion should be denied under Section 1359.r1 A further indicium might be the
47. 72 Stat. 415 (1958), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See generally 1 MooRE, FEDMAL.
PRAcnic- f 0.60, at 640 (2d ed. 1948) ; Phillips & Christenson, Should Corporations Be
Regarded As Citizens Within, the Diversity Jurisdiction Provisions?, 48 A.B.A.J. 435
(1962).
48. It is clear that the appointment of non-resident personal representatives to create
diversity of citizenship is both easy to accomplish and frequently used. See note 1 supra
and accompanying text. In the Lang and Corabi situation there is a clear danger of
encouraging forum shopping if such manufacture of jurisdiction is allowed.
49. Mvfany states require the appointment of an administrator ad prosequendurn to sue
on decedent's wrongful death action if the decedent dies intestate. He acts merely as a
trustee, suing in his name for the benefit of those entitled to take under the statute grant-
ing the action for wrongful death. See, e.g., 2A N.J.S.A. 31-32 (1952).
50. Perhaps recognizing this, in New Jersey an administrator ad prosequendum is a
nominal party, like a guardian ad litem. Loughney v. Thomas, 117 N.J.L. 169, 172, 187
At. 329, 331 (1936).
51. Plaintiff could rebut any inference of impropriety raised when an administrator
resigns in favor of a non-resident by showing, for example, that the original adminis-
trator was unable to continue. See McCoy v. Blakely, 217 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1954), where
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fact that the foreign plaintiff is also the administrator for a number of similar
suits in which he is claiming diversity jurisdiction.52 Such inferences could
be rebutted, of course, by facts indicating a contrary intent. Thus, if the non-
resident administrator is a relative or other person having a close business or
personal relationship with the deceased or his heirs, and has administrative
duties in addition to those involved in the litigation, the inference would be
that the appointment was not primarily to gain diversity jurisdiction, but due
rather to the relationship. 3 Through a careful scrutiny of the circumstances
in each case, then, a court should be able in most cases to determine the
dominant motive in appointing a non-resident personal representative, and
to apply Section 1359 accordingly.
A final objection to the adoption of a primary intent test should be con-
sidered. Rule 17(b) has been interpreted to deny the status of real party in
interest to a non-resident fiduciary where the law of the state in which the
district court sits prohibits him from suing in the state courts.5 4 Thus, if a
state is deeply concerned because its citizens are deprived of recourse to state
courts by manufactured diversity jurisdiction, it can correct the situation it-
the first administrator testified that he could not manage the estate properly from a long
distance, prompting the court to approve the appointment of his successor, a resident of
the same state as decedent but a different state than that of the defendant and the first
administrator.
52. See, e.g., Jamison v. Kemmerer, 264 F.2d 789 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
813 (1959), a companion suit to Corabi, where it was shown that the non-resident ad-
ministrator in that case was also a non-resident administrator in 33 other diversity
actions pending before the same district court.
53. Again, however, such an inference could be rebutted by the facts of the particular
case, as in County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470, 473-74 (8th Cir. 1961), where
decedent's mother, as administratrix, was unsuccessful in gaining federal jurisdiction, and
thereupon resigned in favor of a non-resident sister of the decedent, prompting the court
to note that the appointment of the sister was clearly for the purpose of gaining diversity
jurisdiction.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b):
Capacity to Sue or be Sued. The capacity of an individual, other than one acting
in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of his
domicile. The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the
law under which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued
shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held ....
Where the fiduciary is a nominal party under state law, the citizenship of the bene-
ficiary and not that of the personal representative is looked to for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. Thames v. Mississippi, 117 F.2d 949 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 630
(1941). In Martineau v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill. 1946), the
district court appeared to narrow considerably the scope of rule 17(b) by holding that a
state statute, prohibiting suits by administrators for deaths occurring outside the state,
related only to jurisdiction and, therefore, did not prevent diversity suits in the federal court.
But Professor Moore points out that Angel v. Bullingtor4 330 U.S. 183 (1947) (right un-
enforceable in state court likewise unenforceable in federal court), should be taken to
overrule Martineau. 3 MooRa, FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.19, at 1387 (2d ed. 1948). It thus
appears that a non-resident administrator may not sue in a district court where by state
law he is either a nominal party or lacks capacity to sue in the state courts.
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self.55 But because the state can so act does not mean that federal courts
should not. Important federal, as well as state, policies are infringed by manu-
factured jurisdiction and forum shopping, and to the extent federal policies
may differ, their enforcement should not be left to the states.5 6
55. For categorization of state statutes restricting qualifications to sue of non-resident
fiduciaries, see Note, 37 VA. L. REV. 1119 (1951).
56. In light of the present congestion of state court dockets, it may be that a state
would look unfavorably upon any move which would restrict the present jurisdiction of
the federal courts and, consequently, force more suits into its already crowded courts.
Moreover, Professor Moore points out that if the federal courts are unwilling or unable
to protect their own jurisdiction, it is unlikely that the states -wilU shoulder their burden
for them. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 17.05, at 1322 (2d ed. 1948).
